When is discrimination wrong
She deftly explores the question of how we determine what is in fact demeaning. Claims of wrongful discrimination are among the most common moral claims asserted in public and private life. Yet the roots of these claims are often left unanalyzed. When Is Discrimination Wrong? Celebrating University Press Week. This does not mean however that epistemically grounded discrimination is always, or even often, permissible; most often it is not.
To determine when this is the case we need an alternative—defensible—account of under what conditions an instance of epistemically grounded discrimination is wrong, and preferably of what it is that makes it so. Furthermore we would like such an account to capture variations in the wrongness of discrimination depending on the objects of discrimination.
I suggest that the best account of the wrongness of discrimination, and the one that we should prefer over the Impermissibility Account, is what I will call the Fairness and Externalities Account.
This account states that the wrongness of discrimination is constituted by two independent and defeasible factors:. Fairness: Discriminating against an individual is unfair to that individual, and all else equal it is wrong to treat an individual unfairly. Harmful Externalities: Discriminating against an individual produces harmful externalities for individuals sharing the trait which has been the grounds for discrimination.
When someone is not selected for a job because of their ethnicity, this is unfair to them, because they have ceteris paribus equal desert, need and capacity to perform the job to other applicants. For this reason both Harold and Cassandra are treating their respective applicants unfairly. To be treated fairly is however not an unalienable right, and sometimes we are permitted to treat people unfairly when it is required for overriding reasons. An example of this is might be collective punishment of a platoon for the mistake of an individual, when it is required for discipline.
When there are no such overriding considerations it is wrong to treat individuals unfairly. I believe the fairness condition captures something intuitive about the wrongness of discrimination, in that we all feel—no matter our background—like we are treated unfairly when someone behaves differently to us in an unfavourable way due to some irrelevant trait of ours. I also believe that it is plausible to say that it is ceteris paribus wrong—when nothing sufficiently important is at stake—to treat someone unfairly in such a way.
This condition seems sufficient to explain why all instances of discrimination seem at least somewhat wrong, including e. It does not however explain why we intuitively believe that it is much worse to discriminate against some individuals and groups than others, e. To do this we need to consider the second condition. Acts of discrimination can be harmful, e. However, variation in the harm caused to the individual being discriminated against is insufficient to account for the variation of wrongness that we find depending on the object of discrimination.
Rather there seems to be something relevantly wrong about the discrimination being based on ethnicity, independently of the harm caused to the discriminated individual. I argue that this can be explained in terms of harmful externalities. When someone is discriminated against on the basis of a specific trait, this can produce harmful externalities not only for them but also for others sharing that trait, e.
For example, when Harold systematically disregards an exposed group he is signalling to other employers that this group is not to be trusted, making them less likely to hire members of the ethnic minority. This causes a higher level of unemployment among the ethnic minority and perpetuates alienation, which constitutes a harm to members of that group. In other words, the harm act of discrimination can extend beyond the target of discrimination to others who share her traits.
I believe this can account for cases like Hiring and Au Pair. For example, I would argue that the harm caused to white males by Cassandra by e. Harold on the other hand might more plausibly be contributing to a deep societal problem of segregation along ethnic lines, which is much more problematic. I believe the Fairness and Externalities Account captures the wrongness of discrimination in an intuitive way by both capturing why we think that there is always something wrong about discrimination, but also why the wrongness can vary with the object of discrimination.
Accepting the account would however have some counterintuitive consequences:. Firstly, the nature of externalities is often such that they affect large groups and are produced collectively by many individuals, as is the case when it comes to pollution.
When Is Discrimination Wrong? Interpersonal relations. New Arrivals HM H Barcode: Copyright This is a fight that she need not have taken on. Given the centrality of intention to the law and morality in general, her argument would be even more convincing had she realized that it is entirely consistent with an intention-based morality.
But her contention that intention is simply irrelevant is quite incredible. Intuitively there seems something right about this. Yet there seem to be many cases where one legitimately demeans another — e. Hellman responds that some theories of punishment hold that it does not necessarily demean prisoners, but again she only cites a small number of philosophers who defend this view.
The biggest single concern about her thesis is that these ideas are themselves so vague and in need of explication that they do not seem to provide a useful analysis of the idea of wrongful discrimination. Indeed, many of these ideas are already current in the literature e. The worry is that this is a case of obscuram per obscuris. Moreover, there is yet a deeper puzzle.
Why does the idea of demeaning have two separate dimensions, the insult and the power or status capable of making the insult effective? If moral theory is the basis for her argument, then it is simply puzzling why there must be this second aspect.
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